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The collapse of urea production in the late 
1990s is one of the lingering effects of 
Mexico’s former energy policy framework 
and a pressing issue that policymakers 
have been unable to address. Recent 
developments suggest that such productive 
activity may be closer to reclaiming part of 
its previous strength. The scarcity of locally 
sourced urea (i.e., nitrogen fertilizers) that 
farmers in Mexico have coped with over 
the last two decades—and the resulting 
increase in urea imports—might finally be 
tackled due to a strategy led by Petróleos 
Mexicanos (PEMEX). In January 2014, PEMEX 
purchased urea facilities1 (now operating 
as Pro-Agroindustria) in Coatzacoalcos, 
Veracruz, that had been inactive since 1999. 
Now, after years of revamping the facilities, 
production is reported to have resumed.2 
With two plants ostensibly able to yield up 
to 0.99 million metric tons (MMT) of urea 
annually, PEMEX’s objective is to gradually 
supply a share of the 1.89 MMT Mexico 
imported in 2017. 
 The revival of urea production is 
consistent with the message of Mexico’s new 
President-elect Andrés Manuel López Obrador 
(AMLO), who during his campaign called 
for strengthening the agricultural sector, 
principally the production of basic staples 
such as corn, beans, rice, and wheat.3 
 And though it remains to be seen if 
urea production at Pro-Agroindustria can 
compete in a domestic market currently 
flooded with imports4—and without being 
subsidized by other divisions of PEMEX such 
as Exploration and Production—the restart 
of Pro-Agroindustria could have numerous 
broad impacts that are worth discussing 
in light of Mexico’s current political and 
economic context. 
 First, domestic urea production may have 
considerable impact on import substitution 
and related activities, such as 1) the supply of 
natural gas to southeastern Mexico (including 
the southern tip of Veracruz) and 2) the 
production of ammonia, a key feedstock in 
urea production. Thus, urea production is at 
the heart of a value chain that illustrates how 
Mexico’s energy reforms in 2013 and 2014 
can encourage the development of energy-
related industries.
 Second, the issue of urea production 
fits well with the focus of the new López 
Obrador administration. Importantly, the 
supply of locally produced urea,5 if sold at 
competitive prices to Mexico farmers, aligns 
with recurrent arguments set out by AMLO 
during his campaign.6 The move to foster 
urea production can contribute to increasing 
agricultural productivity in Mexico’s most 
vulnerable regions—that is, southern states to 
which urea produced at Pro-Agroindustria can 
be easily distributed due to their geographical 
proximity. As such, urea production (as 
part of a broader policy framework) may 
help address regional imbalances between 
southern and northern Mexico and strengthen 
Mexico’s food sovereignty, two issues AMLO 
emphasized in his presidential campaign.7 
 That being said, if AMLO seeks to deliver 
on his agricultural promises and overhaul urea 
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sharpest increase registered in the second 
half of the decade. Since the turn of the 
century, urea imports8 have continued to 
climb, reaching 1.89 MMT in 2017, a 52.4 
percent increase since 2000 (Figure 1).9 
Thus, at a projected 100 percent production 
capacity, Pro-Agroindustria alone could 
replace 52 percent of the urea Mexico 
imported in 2017. That depends on whether 
PEMEX can overhaul urea production, given 
that upstream activities confront their 
own challenges for the time being, and if 
the company can improve the operating 
efficiency of its urea production facilities. 
 Also, the production of ammonia, which 
the nearby Cosoleacaque petrochemical 
complex10 is expected to supply, is 
contingent upon four PEMEX-owned plants 
that persistently experience technical 
difficulties. Local buyers claim that the 
supply of ammonia is frequently interrupted 
as production is brought to a halt due to a 
lack of adequate and timely maintenance of 
production equipment. This in part explains 
why ammonia production in Mexico has 
tumbled (Figure 1). 
production, higher standards of efficiency 
must be established at Pro-Agroindustria 
than what PEMEX has accomplished in its 
downstream facilities in the past. 
THE ROLE OF PEMEX AND CENAGAS
PEMEX launched urea production at Pro-
Agroindustria by putting one plant back in 
operation in May 2018; a second plant is 
projected to be operational later in 2018. 
With a combined overall capacity to produce 
up to 0.99 MMT of urea, the focus on 
restarting operations at Pro-Agroindustria 
centers on the impact it may eventually 
have on reducing Mexico’s reliance on 
imports and on upstream activities such as 
natural gas supply and ammonia production 
in southern Veracruz. 
 The shutdown of urea production in the 
1990s left a gap in the domestic market that 
was soon filled by foreign suppliers. From 
1993 to 2000, the year after production 
ceased, imports of urea grew by 5.6 times, 
from 0.22 MMT to 1.24 MMT, with the 
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FIGURE 1 — MEXICO’S IMPORTS OF BASIC STAPLES, NITROGEN FERTILIZERS, AND UREA, AND DOMESTIC 
AMMONIA PRODUCTION (IN MILLION METRIC TONS)
1.89
0.50
SOURCE  Mexico’s Energy Information System (SIE) and U.N. Comtrade Database
UreaNitrogen Fertilizers Ammonia Production Basic Food Staples (secondary axis)
 
3THE UREA VALUE CHAIN IN MEXICO: FROM NATURAL GAS SUPPLY TO IMPORTS OF BASIC FOOD STAPLES
 But technical difficulties are just one 
factor impacting the trajectory of ammonia 
production at Cosoleacaque. It has been 
widely reported that southern Veracruz 
contends with a limited supply of natural 
gas, which has effectively distressed 
operations at ammonia plants (and other 
PEMEX petrochemical plants in the region). 
Both the fall in natural gas production in 
Mexico and infrastructure bottlenecks help 
explain why productivity levels at PEMEX 
petrochemical facilities in the area have 
plummeted in recent years. For example, 
PEMEX reports that the monthly output at 
Cosoleacaque from January to July 2018 
averaged 19,000 metric tons, a 57 percent 
plunge vis-à-vis the volume recorded in 
the same period in 2017.11 All in all, the 
government appears to be aware of the 
critical need to upgrade ammonia plants 
and restore the flow of natural gas to 
the southern region of Veracruz—and to 
southeastern Mexico in general—if the urea 
value chain is to be shored up. 
 Mexico’s Energy Secretariat (SENER) has 
sanctioned the development of projects that 
will help balance the supply of natural gas to 
southern Veracruz. For the National Center 
for Natural Gas Control (CENAGAS), the 
state-owned technical operator of Mexico’s 
largest pipeline grid, the ministry proposes 
upgrading the Cempoala compressor station 
in central Veracruz to facilitate the supply 
of natural gas from northern sources (i.e., 
imports via the South Texas—Tuxpan 
pipeline) to southeastern states. In addition, 
a rented floating storage regasification 
unit (FSRU) off the coast of Coatzacoalcos, 
where the Pro-Agroindustria urea plants 
are situated, is expected to source LNG 
from the U.S. to meet demand by PEMEX’s 
petrochemical plants in the region as well 
as other users such as power plants and 
industrial consumers in central Mexico.12 
 Importantly, urea production at Pro-
Agroindustria may have a significant 
impact on the Cosoleacaque petrochemical 
complex, which highlights the importance 
of reestablishing the supply of natural gas 
to ammonia plants. PEMEX contends that 
each urea plant has the capacity to yield 
1,500 metric tons daily; at full capacity, this 
would require 885 metric tons of ammonia, 
or 1,770 metric tons per day if both urea 
plants are operating.13 In annual figures, 
the petrochemical complex would need 
to produce—continuously—1.37 MMT of 
ammonia, or 174 percent more than the 
volume it produced in 2017 (Figure 1). 
And while capacity utilization will ultimately 
be less than 100 percent due to annual 
and unplanned maintenance, the numbers 
above illustrate the magnitude of the 
impact urea production could have on 
ammonia production.
THE AMMONIA–UREA CORRELATION
The collapse of the urea industry in the late 
1990s is arguably the result of a policy that 
linked the price of domestic natural gas 
to prices along the southern coast of the 
United States, which were relatively high at 
that point in time. This caused a price spike 
that made the production of ammonia at 
Cosoleacaque and other PEMEX facilities—and 
therefore that of urea—unfeasible. As a result, 
Mexican production could not compete with 
international supply.14
 In short, this policy greatly contributed to 
the pronounced fall in ammonia output in the 
second half of the 1990s. PEMEX’s production 
stood at 2.5 MMT in 1996 but plummeted to 
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FIGURE 2 — LINEAR CORRELATION BETWEEN AMMONIA PRODUCTION 
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SOURCE  Mexico’s Energy Information System (SIE) and U.N. Comtrade Database
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0.92 MMT in 2000. This downward trajectory 
has continued until the present. With the 
limited supply of ammonia domestically, and 
the resulting high prices, urea imports soared 
rapidly from 9,374 metric tons in 1995 to 1.24 
MMT by the end of the decade and to 1.89 
MMT as of 2017. These numbers indicate that, 
in Mexico’s case, there seems to be a strong 
association between the drop in ammonia 
production and the rise in urea imports, 
which is hinted at in Figure 1. 
 Likewise, Figure 2 illustrates the virtually 
perfect linear correlation between the levels 
of ammonia production (Y) and urea imports 
(X) from 1990 to 2017. Both variables 
register a solid negative correlation of 
-0.96149, indicating that a drop in ammonia 
production is almost proportionally mirrored 
by a rise in urea imports.15 
IMPORTS OF BASIC FOOD STAPLES
The production of basic food staples (corn, 
wheat, rice, and beans)16 is a crucial 
component of the economic architecture 
of Mexico’s rural areas, where 20.5 
percent of the country’s population 
resides.17 Approximately 58.2 percent of 
this population lives in poverty.18 Mexico’s 
strong dependency on imports of food 
staples garnered attention from López 
Obrador, who in the months leading up to 
the July 1 election pledged to strengthen the 
country’s food sovereignty. To paraphrase, 
he proposed to improve living conditions 
in rural areas by “making Mexico’s 
agroindustry great again”—although the 
campaign proposal failed to underline 
the potential influence urea production 
at PEMEX-owned plants may have on 
accomplishing that goal.
 Mexico’s inability to produce urea 
domestically is one of several factors that 
explain the recent state of its agriculture 
industry, at least with respect to basic food 
staples, whose production failed to increase 
in tandem with apparent consumption. This 
has left a gap in Mexico’s market that has 
been filled by additional imports (Figure 3). 
From 1999 to 2005, production of basic food 
staples stayed flat, growing marginally from 
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FIGURE 3 — MEXICO’S PRODUCTION OF BASIC FOOD STAPLES, OVERALL IMPORTS, AND APPARENT 
CONSUMPTION (IN MILLION METRIC TONS)
SOURCE  Mexico’s Agri-food and Fisheries Information Service (SIAP) and U.N. Comtrade Database
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22.12 MMT to 23.46 MMT (an increase of 6.05 
percent), whereas food imports expanded 
from 8.92 MMT to 10.26 MMT (a 15 percent 
increase). In subsequent years, despite food 
production increasing to 32.71 MMT in 2017 
(a rise of 39.4 percent vis-à-vis 2005), 
the gap continued to broaden as imports 
stood at 21.57 MMT (a jump of 110 percent 
compared to 2005). 
 But do imports really jeopardize a 
country’s food security? A report published 
by the Superior Audit Office of the House 
of Representatives (ASF), the specialized 
technical body that oversees the use 
of federal resources across government 
agencies, cites findings from the Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) suggesting that the share 
of imports should not be higher than 25 
percent of domestic consumption. The 
last year that Mexico registered a figure 
lower than that was 1997, when imports 
accounted for 18 percent of consumption.19 
 Mexico’s ability to meet its demand for 
basic staples through domestic production 
started to worsen as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into 
effect (Figure 4). In 1993, imports accounted 
for just 9 percent of consumption; since 
then, imports surged to 41 percent of 
apparent consumption in 2017, the highest 
level since the passage of NAFTA. Of the 
country’s four basic staple foods, Mexico 
is most dependent on imports for rice (82 
percent), followed by wheat (62 percent), 
corn (37 percent), and beans (12 percent), as 
noted in Figure 4.20 
 Out of all the basic staple foods, corn 
deserves special consideration since it 
is the foremost driver behind Mexico’s 
overall imports in terms of metric tons 
(71.11 percent in 2017). Here, the rise of 
corn imports is not associated with a fall 
in domestic production, which in fact 
expanded by 53 percent between 1993 
and 2017, from 18.13 MMT to 27.76 MMT. 
Rather, the gap is explained by the fact that 
such an increase in production proved to 
be insufficient to match the expansion of 
domestic demand over that period. Mexico’s 
apparent consumption grew from 18.29 
MMT in 1993 to 41.44 MMT in 2017, which 
equals a jump of 126.6 percent (Figure 5). 
 Import dependency has become acute, 
in relative terms. As depicted in Figure 
5, the share of corn imports in relation to 
domestic production rose steeply over the 
last two and a half decades, from 1.2 percent 
in 1993—when Mexico bought just 0.21 MMT 
of corn—to 55.3 percent in 2017—when 
imports reached 15.34 MMT. And these are 
figures that many—including the Peña-Nieto 
administration21—believed could be lessened 
through a broader policy framework that 
includes the development of the urea value 
chain. Given his campaign promises, Mexico’s 
president-elect should be similarly inclined.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The breakdown of the urea value chain in 
the 1990s was in part the result of natural 
gas pricing. Since Mexico now has greater 
access to the inexpensive natural gas supply 
from shale formations in the United States, 
restoring part of the urea value chain is a 
discussion worth having. 
 Putting the urea plants in Coatzacoalcos, 
Veracruz, back into operation could impact 
multiple downstream activities, including 
ammonia production at the Cosoleacaque 
petrochemical complex and infrastructure 
Mexico’s aggressive 
strategy around 
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country’s industrial 
apparatus.
FIGURE 4 — IMPORTS OF BASIC FOOD STAPLES AS A PERCENT OF 
APPARENT CONSUMPTION
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6investment to reestablish the natural gas 
supply in the region. This demonstrates how 
Mexico’s aggressive strategy around natural 
gas supply can also strengthen the country’s 
industrial apparatus, in addition to being a 
major force behind the development of the 
power sector. This elucidates the wide effects 
that the deepening of the instrumentation 
of Mexico’s energy reform can have over a 
broader economic spectrum. 
 Moreover, if PEMEX manages to increase 
the supply of ammonia, it can have a 
positive impact on firms that produce other 
nitrogen fertilizers in Mexico. Likewise, the 
infrastructure projects CENAGAS is planning 
(i.e., the Cempoala compressor station and 
the floating regasification unit) may also 
foster economic activity as they deliver 
additional volumes of natural gas to southern 
Veracruz and beyond. That could persuade 
PEMEX to revamp production at the three 
other petrochemical complexes it operates in 
the region, and also prompt industrial users 
to invest in southeastern states. 
 As for the incoming López Obrador 
administration, AMLO will need to examine 
two issues that are deeply embedded in the 
energy policy: 1) the future of energy reforms 
that began under the previous administration, 
which AMLO criticized at the beginning of his 
campaign before somewhat toning down 
his rhetoric; and 2) the complex nature of 
Mexico’s relationship with the U.S., which can 
guarantee the secure delivery of inexpensive 
shale gas but is also Mexico’s food supplier. 
 Domestic production of urea could 
become one of the key elements to 
delivering food sovereignty—one of the new 
president-elect’s major campaign promises. 
The eventual supply of urea to farmers in 
rural Mexico would be well received by 
AMLO’s political base. This could in turn 
provide the president-elect political cover 
to continue with the current energy reform. 
In fact, AMLO has an opportunity to expand 
and deepen the reform to help other areas 
of Mexico’s economy, including agriculture, 
petrochemicals, downstream projects, 
and potentially other economic activities 
(manufacturing) that could benefit from a 
greater supply of natural gas and a more 
efficient energy sector.
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FIGURE 5 — MEXICO’S PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF CORN
SOURCE  Mexico’s Agri-food and Fisheries Information. Service (SIAP) and U.N. Comtrade Database
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